Is There a 1033 Effect? Police Militarization and Aggressive Policing by Ajilore, Olugbenga
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Is There a 1033 Effect? Police
Militarization and Aggressive Policing
Olugbenga Ajilore
30 October 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82543/
MPRA Paper No. 82543, posted 17 November 2017 15:26 UTC
Is there a 1033 Effect? Police Militarization and Aggressive Policing 
 
Author:  Olugbenga Ajilore 
Affiliation:  University of Toledo 
Address:  2801 Bancroft St. 
     Department of Economics 
     Toledo, OH 43606-3390 
Phone:  (419) 530-2113 
E-mail:   gbenga.ajilore@utoledo.edu   
 
Abstract 
Events in Ferguson and Baltimore in the United States in the past 3 years have brought to light 
issues related to the militarization of police and adverse police–citizen interactions. Through 
federal programs and grants, local law enforcement agencies have been able to acquire surplus 
military items to combat terrorism and drug activity. The acquisition of these items has 
accelerated over the past 10 years. These agencies acquired nearly $1 billion worth of property in 
2014 alone through the Pentagon’s 1033 Program, a program that distributes excess military 
surplus to law enforcement agencies. This study seeks to determine whether the increased 
acquisition of these items has led to more police use-of-force incidents. We create a dataset 
merging administrative data from the Pentagon’s 1033 Program database and survey data from 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Using a binary treatment effects estimator, we show that there is 
little evidence of a causal link between general military surplus acquisition and documented use-
of-force incidents. In fact, the acquisition of military vehicles leads to fewer use-of-force 
incidents. The results also show that more diverse departments have fewer incidents, while 
agencies with SWAT team have more incidents. 
 
JEL Codes: H70, H76, K42 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent incidents of adverse police–public interactions have become national news in the United 
States as a result of seemingly unnecessary escalations to violence. The names Eric Garner, 
Alton Sterling, Tamir Rice, and Sandra Bland are well known to the public. The increasing 
militarization of the police is also at the forefront of media attention. Local law enforcement 
agencies have been acquiring items previously commissioned for use in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
help combat terrorism and drug-related activities in the United States (Grasso, 2013). Although 
many programs have contributed to the increasing militarization of local law enforcement, the 
1033 Program, a program that distributes excess military surplus to law enforcement agencies, is 
the most well known of these programs. Through the work of several institutions, including 
MuckRock (Musgrave, 2014) and National Public Radio (Rezvani et al., 2014), data on 1033 
Program acquisitions have been made available through the Pentagon. Many in the 
#BlackLivesMatter movement argue there is a connection between the increasing militarization 
of police and the excessive use of force by officers.1 From a (social) media perspective, the 
militarization of police may appear to have had a causal impact on the seemingly growing 
number of incidents of use of force by police. 
In economic literature, studies of police behavior tend to focus on racial profiling and 
bias in policing (Knowles et al., 2001; Anwar and Fang, 2006; Close and Mason, 2007; 
Antonovics and Knight, 2009). Research on the use of force is scarce, although a recent National 
Bureau of Economic Research working paper by Roland Fryer looks at whether there are racial 
differences in the treatment of citizens by police officers (Fryer, 2016). His findings show race is 
a factor in use-of-force incidents, but not in officer-involved shootings. Ajilore and Shirey 
                                                          
1 http://www.joincampaignzero.org/solutions/#solutionsoverview  
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(2017), in a study of citizen complaints to the Chicago Police Department, finds that African 
Americans who live in Chicago’s South Side are less likely to have their complaints sustained. 
In criminal justice literature, the determinants of police use of force have been analyzed 
by many scholars (Friedrich, 1980; Garner et al., 2002; Worden, 1995). These determinants fall 
into four broad categories: individual, situational, organizational, and community. The consensus 
is that the primary factor in use-of-force incidents is situational, depending on a suspect’s 
characteristics and the seriousness of the crime (Riksheim and Chermak, 1993). However, one 
difficulty in analyzing the issue is the consideration of the interactions between factors (Sun et 
al., 2008). Another issue in studying the use of force is that most studies use incident and arrest 
data for only one or several cities (Hickman et al. (2008) Appendix). Few nationally 
representative databases are available, for which the findings can be generalized. 
The question posed in this study is whether local law enforcement agencies that request 
military surplus items are more likely to have more incidents of confrontational police behavior 
than those agencies that do not. This is not a study of individual police–citizen interactions in 
which a use of force has occurred but rather an agency-level study on the total number of use-of-
force incidents. In this study, we examine the relationship between the acquisition of surplus 
military items and the number of use-of-force incidents by law enforcement officers using survey 
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the Pentagon’s 1033 Program database.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 Law enforcement agencies can acquire military items through various programs 
administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Programs administered through the DOD include the 
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1033 Program and the 1122 Program, which allow for the acquisition of military surplus either at 
no cost (1033) or through the purchase of new equipment (1122). The DOJ programs are grants 
to states and localities to assist in law enforcement activity. These funds are mostly used for the 
hiring of new police officers to combat the illegal drug trade and gang-related activity. The DHS 
programs deliver funds to localities to combat terrorism. In each of these programs, the “War on 
Drugs” or “War on Terror” has been used as justification for procurement, regardless of whether 
there have been incidents related to drugs, gang activity, or terrorist activity (Hall and Coyne, 
2013). 
 One of the more well-known programs, the 1033 Program, has become a conduit for a 
significant increase in the acquisition of military surplus items. This program began in 1990 but 
was formalized in 1997 through the National Defense Authorization Act, which enabled all local 
law enforcement agencies to acquire surplus property. The law enforcement agencies must 
request items with the approval of a state officer, appointed by the governor, and Law 
Enforcement Support Office staff. Preference is given to counter-drug and counter-terrorism 
activities. This program is popular because these local agencies can acquire these items without 
cost. Two recent papers have attempted to estimate the effect of police militarization on a 
number of policing outcomes. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) find that militarization has lowered 
crime rates, and Harris et al. (2017), using distance to field activity centers as an instrument, 
reach the same result. However, police militarization may have other impacts beyond that on 
crime. The acquisition of military surplus may be driven by demographic changes, such as race 
and immigration, instead of criminal activity. Ajilore (2015) finds that more ethnically 
segregated counties are more likely to acquire mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) 
vehicles. 
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To understand how the acquisition of military items can lead to excessive use-of-force 
incidents, we need to explain why individuals with punitive preferences are more likely to have 
law enforcement jobs. Individuals with a given set of preferences will self-select into certain 
institutions. For example, people who love children are more likely to become elementary school 
teachers or daycare providers. Individuals who care about the environment are more likely to 
work at the Environmental Protection Agency or the Sierra Club. Likewise, individuals with 
interests in justice or punishment will self-select into law enforcement jobs that offer the 
opportunity to catch criminals and punish wrongdoers. 
Prendergast (2007) develops a principal–agent model to explain the motivation of 
bureaucrats. In the model, a principal hires an agent to enact the preferences of a client. For 
example, law enforcement agencies hire police offers to enforce laws on behalf of citizens. If 
citizens in a jurisdiction have strong preferences for justice, the agency needs to hire officers that 
will enforce laws in a way that aligns with citizens’ preferences. The outcome of the model is 
that those who self-select into certain bureaucracies will accept lower wages because these 
individuals can act upon their preferences. Based on the wage offered, the model predicts that 
two types of individuals will self-select into law enforcement: people who seek justice and 
people who want to punish others. 
Dharmapala et al. (2016) extend this research and model how law enforcement can 
consist of individuals who have punitive preferences. These researchers cite literature from 
experimental economics that supports the existence of punitive preferences. We can regard the 
excessive use of force as representing a preference for “extreme punishment.” Individuals with 
punitive preferences may self-select into law enforcement jobs, and the acquisition of military 
items may intensify these preferences, which translate into a greater number of excessive use-of-
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force incidents. If individuals with punitive preferences have a tendency to become police 
officers, the following question arises: does access to night vision equipment, tanks, body armor, 
and tactical weapons embolden these individuals to be more confrontational? In Section 4, we 
specify an empirical model to test the hypothesis that agencies that acquire more surplus military 
items have more use-of-force incidents. 
 
3. DATA  
3.1 Sample 
The data to estimate our model are obtained from the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey for 2013. This survey is conducted by the DOJ’s BJS, 
and is a nationally representative survey of law enforcement agencies. This survey is conducted 
periodically, although the last survey conducted prior to 2013 was in 2007. The data include 
information on agency responsibilities, operating expenditure, salaries, education and training 
requirements, agency demographics, technology use, and weapon policies. The survey primarily 
covers local police departments but also includes sheriffs’ offices and state law enforcement 
agencies. LEMAS is not the most comprehensive database on use-of-force incidents. The Police-
Public Contact Survey (PPCS), a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey, has 
more detailed data on the nature of police–citizen interactions. However, the PPCS does not have 
geographic identifiers that would enable the linking of that data to military surplus acquisitions 
from the 1033 Program.  
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Data on the acquisition of military surplus items is taken from the Pentagon’s website,2 
which states all acquisitions requested by local law enforcement agencies. The data are listed by 
agency, item requested, the original acquisition value,3 and the date the item was shipped to the 
agency. The Pentagon data were aggregated by agency to facilitate a merger with LEMAS data. 
While the LEMAS survey data is from 2013, the information references 2012; therefore, the 
Pentagon data are aggregated through to the end of 2011. 
 
3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is the number of use-of-force incidents per 100 officers. In the 
survey, most agencies have use-of-force forms to document incidents, but only approximately 
one-third of the agencies document use of force within arrest reports. In addition, most agencies 
file only one report per incident rather than separate reports for each officer involved. Some 
agencies did not have exact counts of incidents; hence, these counts were estimated. We include 
a dummy variable for agencies that estimated the number of incidents.  
The primary independent variable is the quantity of military surplus acquisitions through 
the 1033 Program for an agency in 2011. This measure is not normalized by the number of 
officers because we transform it into a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if the 
agency acquired surplus, and zero otherwise. We use a binary treatment effects estimator, which 
is why we use a binary specification of the independent variable. Although the program has 
existed since 1990, large-scale acquisitions did not begin until 2006. This measure is based on 
                                                          
2 http://www.dispositionservices.dla.mil/leso/Pages/default.aspx. The program is operated by the Defense 
Logistics Agency. 
3 As these items were originally purchased by the U.S. Military, this does not reflect the costs borne by the agency. 
The only costs to the agency are the transportation and transaction costs incurred in the acquisition of the item. 
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the DOD’s collection of items acquired through the Pentagon’s 1033 Program. The agencies 
have access to all types of military items including vehicles, tools, weapons, and electronic 
systems. The second independent variable details four different categories: tactical items,4 
vehicles (including tracked and wheeled), surveillance items (including night vision items), and 
clothing (e.g., body armor and camouflage outfits). Table 1 outlines the surplus acquisitions by 
category for the time period. 
Table 1. Distribution of Surplus Acquisition by Category 
 Total Surplus 1033 Only 
Total Acquisitions 46.5% 100.0% 
2011 Acquisitions 11.0% 23.6% 
   
Tactical 40.4% 86.8% 
Weapons 40.3% 86.6% 
   
Vehicles 8.0% 17.3% 
Vehicles (tracked) 1.3% 2.9% 
Vehicles (wheeled) 1.6% 3.3% 
   
Surveillance 7.7% 16.6% 
Night Vision 7.0% 15.1% 
   
Clothing 2.6% 5.7% 
Body Armor 1.2% 2.7% 
   
Number of Agencies 1,928 897 (46.5%) 
 
Table 1 shows that less than 50% of the sample acquired some type of surplus item through the 
1033 Program. The primary items received by these agencies are tactical items, of which the 
majority are guns, followed by vehicles and surveillance items. One item that has received 
considerable media attention is MRAP vehicles. This item would be categorized as a tracked 
vehicle and Table 1 shows that it accounts only for 2.9% of all acquisitions. 
                                                          
4 In addition to weapons, tactical items include fire control items, ammunition and explosives, grenade launchers, 
aircraft accessories, and ships. 
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The control variables include measures pertaining to the agency and characteristics of the 
community that the agency serves. The agency measures are taken from the LEMAS, while the 
demographic data are taken from the 2011 5-year sample of the American Community Survey 
(ACS). In the principal–agent model, agencies that offered higher wages would be less likely to 
only have individuals with punitive preferences apply for openings. Therefore, we include a 
measure of entry-level salary for officers in the model. Agencies that offer a higher entry salary 
should attract a wider variety of applications with diverse preferences. Based on previous 
studies, enforcement culture plays a large role in use of force incidents (Miller, 2015). 
Explanatory variables to measure culture include whether the agencies have dedicated task forces 
to combat terrorism, gang activity, or drug activity. Although this study focuses on the 1033 
Program, many federal government programs direct resources toward combating the “War on 
Terror” or the “War on Drugs.” Federal grants and surplus items are purposed for these 
activities. If such agencies have dedicated task forces devoted to these wars, this may suggest a 
culture with norms towards enforcement. We include a dummy variable whether the agency has 
a SWAT task force.5 SWAT teams have been linked to many incidents where an excessive use of 
force occurred (ACLU, 2014). We include a dummy variable whether the agency’s budget 
includes money from asset forfeiture. Agencies that receive revenue from asset forfeiture may be 
more aggressive in terms of enforcement (Benson, Rasmussen, and Sollars, 1995). We also 
examine whether officers have body cameras or cameras in their cars. We seek to determine 
whether these items could potentially mitigate the number of use-of-force incidents. We include 
the share of the police force that is African American and the share of the police force that is 
                                                          
5 The SWAT, gang, and drug task forces are multi-jurisdictional. The terrorism unit is agency specific. 
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Hispanic or Latino. Finally, we include whether the agency requires at least eight hours of 
community policing training, whether the officer is a new recruit, or if it was in-service6. 
Other explanatory variables include demographic characteristics that would affect the 
demand for police services at the county level. We use the county as the geographic level for the 
demographics because it more accurately resembles the population an agency serves, as people 
travel in and out of the jurisdiction. Demographic variables include median income, 
unemployment rate, crime index, Gini index, elderly population, youth population, and owner-
occupied housing. Racial and ethnic diversity has been shown to be an important factor in 
policing outcomes and therefore we include the African-American share, Latino share, and 
residential segregation. Residential segregation is measured by the dissimilarity index, which is 
shown in (1): 
𝐷 = ∑ ∑
𝑡𝑗
2𝑇𝐼
|𝜋𝑗𝑚 − 𝜋𝑚|
𝐽
𝑗−1
𝑀
𝑚=1 .      (1) 
Measure (1) is a multi-group segregation index aggregating data for multiple ethnic groups 
(Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002), where T is the total population, M is the number of ethnic 
groups m, J is the number of census tracts, and I is Simpson’s interaction index (the Simpson’s 
interaction index is given by 𝐼 = ∑ 𝜋𝑚(1 − 𝜋𝑚)
𝑀
𝑚=1  and measures the basic diversity of a 
population). Furthermore, 𝑡𝑗 is the number of individuals in the census tract, 𝜋𝑗𝑚 is the 
proportion in group m, and 𝜋𝑚 is the proportion in group m in census tract j. We include 
dummies for agencies that are not local police: sheriffs’ departments or state agencies. The total 
number of observations is 1,928. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. 
  
                                                          
6 This refers to experienced officers completing their training. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable (Total) (Incidents only)    
Incidents per 100 officers 33.9 77.5 196.2 0 6,960 
      
 Acquisitions       
Total Acquisitions 7.3 9.5 44.0 0 2,504 
Acquisitions in 2011 4.0 5.8 42.2 0 2,504 
Tactical items (total) 5.0 6.4 25.8 0 1,119 
Vehicles (total) 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 10 
Surveillance items (total) 0.6 0.8 7.8 0 317 
Clothing items (total) 0.7 1.1 16.6 0 1,311 
      
Controls (Agency)      
Entry-level Wage 46,217.41 48,163.77 18,045.05 17,160.00 195,247.00 
Asset Forfeiture (Budget) 35.8% 41.3% 0.48 0 1 
Body Camera 30.0% 30.4% 0.46 0 1 
Dash Camera 70.7% 70.2% 0.46 0 1 
Share of force that is Black 3.8% 4.1% 0.09 0 78.5% 
Share of force that is Latino 5.1% 5.3% 0.14 0 100% 
Community Policing (8 hours) 57.0% 60.3% 0.50 0 1 
      
Agency Task Forces      
SWAT (multijurisdictional) 30.8% 35.9% 0.46 0 1 
Gangs (multijurisdictional) 15.1% 17.2% 0.36 0 1 
Drugs (multijurisdictional) 54.8% 60.0% 0.50 0 1 
Terrorism Unit 47.8% 50.4% 0.50 0 1 
      
Controls (County Demographics)      
Share Elderly 14.8% 14.3% 0.04 5.6% 42.2% 
Share Owner-Occupied Housing 71.8% 71.1% 0.08 22.7% 90.2% 
Share Youth 13.5% 13.7% 0.03 5.4% 34.8% 
Gini Index 0.436 0.436 0.03 0.334 0.601 
Unemployment Rate 5.1% 5.3% 0.02 0.3% 10.7% 
Median Household Income 50,418.62 51,599.14 13,944.68 22,982.00 120,096.00 
Crime Index 2,622.69 2,779.5 1,217.6 0 8,040.1 
African-American Share 8.6% 9.1% 0.12 0 74.1% 
Latino Share 9.5% 10.1% 0.13 0 90.4% 
Segregation (Dissimilarity) Index 0.338 0.339 0.12 0 0.705 
Population 39,194 55,137 319,809 196 19,200,000 
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The first column provides the means for all agencies in the sample. The second column shows 
the means for the agencies that had at least one incident. These agencies were more likely to 
have task forces dedicated to combating terrorism, gang activity, and drug activity. In addition, 
the agencies with incidents had higher entry-level salaries and used asset forfeiture. These 
agencies were in counties with a higher median income but a lower elderly population and less 
owner-occupied housing. Furthermore, these agencies were in counties with higher crime rates 
and larger populations.  
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Basic Regressions 
Our baseline model provides an initial estimate of the relationship between surplus 
acquisition from the 1033 program and use of force incidents. In the estimation, incidents and 
acquisitions are normalized by the number of sworn officers so that comparisons across agencies 
can be made. The model is provided as shown: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,      (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the number of incidents per 100 officers and 𝑋𝑖 are the explanatory variables 
described in Table 2. The coefficient 𝛽1 indicates whether there is correlation between the 
cumulative acquisition of surplus items and the number of incidents. Table 3 provides the 
estimates of the regression of surplus acquisitions including specific categories of acquisitions on 
use-of-force incidents.  
Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates   
Total Tactical Vehicles Surveillance Clothing 
Surplus Acquisitions 0.021 0.070+ 0.135+ 0.116+ 0.110+  
(0.021) (0.036) (0.075) (0.062) (0.062) 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
The acquisition of surplus items throughout 2011 is positively correlated with use-of-force 
incidents in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. This mildly significant effect is 
consistent across all types of surplus acquisitions. 
 
4.2  Endogeneity 
The results of these previous regressions show a correlation between the acquisition of 
surplus military items and the number of use-of-force incidents. However, these estimates 
assume that acquiring the surplus items and the number of incidents are independent actions, 
which may not be the case. Certain agency-related factors might lead them to want to acquire 
military items. As mentioned in Section 2, individuals with preferences toward punishing 
criminals may self-select into law enforcement. Agencies that have officers with punitive 
preferences that lead to excessive use-of-force incidents may want to acquire military items 
because of these preferences. In this case, that agency acquires surplus items and will have more 
incidents, although it is not a causal link. The question that needs to be answered is whether 
police departments that want to behave more aggressively acquire more military surplus items or 
whether the acquisition of military surplus causes more aggressive behavior. A method needs to 
be implemented to establish causality and address the selection issue. To address these issues, we 
can place the model within an evaluation framework using a treatment effects estimator. If we 
view the acquisition of military surplus as a treatment, we can estimate the average treatment 
effect using a binary treatment estimator. That is, we can ask the question, what would happen to 
the number of incidents at an agency if it acquired surplus military items? 
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We transform the specification given in (2) into a potential outcomes specification for 
which the binary treatment is where an agency makes the choice to acquire surplus through the 
1033 Program: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,        (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the number of incidents per 100 sworn officers, 𝑆𝑖 = 1 if the agency acquired 
surplus items and 0 if they did not, and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of explanatory variables (from Table 1) 
with effects given by 𝛽2. Our goal is to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE), which is the 
difference between the average effect if an agency is treated and the average effect for an agency 
that is not treated. In addition, we can estimate the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATET), which is the average treatment effect for the subsample of individuals that are treated. 
We can also estimate the average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATENT), which is the 
average treatment effect for the subsample of individuals that are not treated. Furthermore, ATE 
is the weighted average of ATET and ATENT. 
The standard treatment effects estimators make the following three assumptions: (1) the 
conditional mean independence assumption, which restricts the dependence between the 
treatment model and potential outcomes; (2) the overlap assumption, which requires each 
individual to have a positive probability of receiving the treatment; and (3) the assumption that 
errors are independently and identically distributed. Assumption (1) may be too strong and in the 
case that it does not hold, we employ an estimator that allows for the treatment effects to be 
heterogeneous. There may be reasons for an agency acquiring surplus items that are not random, 
as would be the assumption using standard treatment effects estimators. In this case, we need to 
estimate an ATE that is conditioned on variables that could drive the heterogeneity. We use 
several agency-level measures that may drive a heterogeneous response to the treatment. We 
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include task force dummies, an asset forfeiture dummy, and race and ethnicity variables. These 
variables would drive heterogeneous responses because the existence of these task forces 
provides an avenue by which the surplus items would be employed in the community.7 
 
4.3 Instruments 
 Great care must be taken when finding instruments that pass the exclusion restriction. An 
instrument must be correlated with the treatment variable but conditionally independent of the 
outcome measure. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) use national-level military expenditures weighted 
by the probability of receiving surplus equipment that provide variation by region and time. 
While fluctuations in national-level military expenditures should impact the amount of available 
surplus, Harris et al. (2017) use the location of distribution centers as an instrument. They use the 
distance between the county centroid and one of 18 field activity centers (FAC). The 18 FACs 
are a part of 76 distribution centers interspersed throughout the country.8 This study uses the 
distance to the distribution center from the agency as an instrument. The further away a center is, 
the less likely an agency will acquire surplus military equipment. To account for the center being 
a FAC, we include a dummy regarding whether that distribution center is a FAC. This study is a 
cross-sectional analysis, so we do not have to worry about the fact that the instrument is time 
invariant. 
Harris et al. (2017) use knowledge gained from conversations with Pentagon officials to 
include two other instruments, a High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) designation and 
county land area. Because one of the justifications for the 1033 Program is to help local law 
                                                          
7 For example, agencies with SWAT teams would use night vision goggles differently than agencies without SWAT 
teams. 
8 http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Contact/FindLocation.aspx  
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enforcement departments combat drug activity, priority is given to regions with high levels of 
drug trafficking. Agencies in HIDTA regions and agencies in larger counties are given special 
consideration for surplus items. Land area in terms of square footage and a dummy that 
designates whether an agency is located in a HIDTA region are also included as instruments.9 In 
Appendix Table 2A, diagnostics show the instruments perform well. The Kliebergen-Paap F 
Statistic is 15.322 and the Hansen J-statistic has a p-value of 0.385. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Probit Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions 
We employ a probit two-stage least squares (probit-2sls) estimator, as developed by 
Cerulli (2014). In the first stage, we apply a probit of the treatment (𝑆𝑖) on the explanatory 
variables and the instruments described in section 4.3. From this, we obtain the predicted 
probability of being treated. The second step is to run an OLS regression of the treatment on the 
explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖 and the predicted probability from the first step. The third step is to run 
a second OLS of incidents on the explanatory variables, the predicted probability from the first 
step, and fitted values from the second step. The final step is the use of the estimated parameters 
to recover the causal effects and obtain standard errors for the ATET and ATENT using a 
bootstrap method. This procedure produces a more efficient and consistent estimator of the ATE. 
The three average treatment effects are provided in Table 4. The results of the first stage probit 
and the complete results are given in the Appendix Table 2A. 
  
                                                          
9 In 2011, there were 28 HIDTA designated regions. These are collapsed into 16 regions because some regions have 
small sample sizes. See Figure 1A in the Appendix for the regions. 
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Table 4. Average Treatment Effects 
 Surplus 2011 only 
ATE(𝑋𝑖) 0.772 -0.294 
 (0.794) (1.721) 
ATET(𝑋𝑖) 0.752 -0.187 
 (0.816) (1.882) 
ATENT(𝑋𝑖) 0.772 -0.294) 
 (0.794) (1.721) 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard errors in parentheses; Standard 
errors for the ATET and ATENT are calculated using a bootstrap with 100 replications. 
 
ATE(𝑋𝑖) is the average treatment effect conditioned on the explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖. We can 
consider these as individual specific average treatment effects. The results obtained show that 
surplus acquisitions do not have significant effects on use-of-force incidents. 
In Appendix table 2A, the results of the control measures show the largest driver of 
incidents is population size. Agencies with a SWAT team see a higher prevalence of incidents. 
This fits with the anecdotal evidence of excessive force by units devoted to combating terrorism 
or drug activity (ACLU, 2014). Counties with a larger elderly population and higher median 
income see a lower prevalence of use-of-force incidents. These results are intuitive as counties 
with a higher socioeconomic status are less likely to experience use-of-force incidents. Finally, 
agencies with a larger share of African-American officers also see a lower prevalence of use-of 
force-incidents. This provides evidence that having a more diverse agency can lower the level of 
excessive use-of-force incidents. 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the models using different estimation procedures. 
In addition to the probit-2sls model, there is the direct two-stage least squares (direct-2sls) 
method, which is an instrumental variables (IV) regression fit directly with two-stage least 
squares, the probit-OLS method, which is an IV two-step regression fit by probit and OLS, and 
finally, the Heckit method, which is a Heckman two-step selection model. We also include a 
simple unconditional difference in means t-test. 
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Table 5. Comparison of ATE from Binary Treatment Estimation Methods  
T-test Direct-2sls Probit-2sls Probit-OLS Heckit 
Acquired Items (𝑆𝑖 = 1) 1.991*** 0.933 0.761  0.810 
 (0.079) (0.630) (0.729)  (0.595) 
G_fv10    0.558  
    (0.631)  
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The results in Table 5 show that the treatment of surplus acquisition does not lead to a greater 
number of incidents and this finding is robust.  
 
5.2 Categories 
 The previous models looked at total acquisition as a dependent variable. Now we 
estimate models in various categories to see if the type of acquisition matters for use-of-force 
incidents. It is plausible that the acquisition of guns will affect officers differently than the 
acquisition of military vehicles. 
Table 6. Estimate of Effect of Acquisitions on Use of Force by Item Category (N=1,928)  
Tactical Vehicles Surveillance Clothing 
Acquired Items (𝑆𝑖 = 1) 0.356 -2.887+ -1.438 7.150 
 (0.644) (1.484) (2.391) (7.399) 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 6 shows that only vehicles have a mildly significant effect on incidents. Agencies that 
acquired vehicles are less likely to have incidents. While given the media coverage of MRAPs 
and other large combat and assault vehicles, this category also includes smaller passenger 
vehicles, trailers, and motorcycles. 
                                                          
10 This represents the predicted probability from the probit regression, conditional on the observable confounders. 
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We can break this category down further. In Table 7, we separate vehicles into tracked 
vehicles and wheeled vehicles.11 We also focus more closely on tactical items (looking only at 
weapons, surveillance items), night vision items, and clothing (specifically body armor). 
Table 7. Estimates of Surplus Acquisitions on Incidents by Smaller Category  
Weapons Vehicles  
(Tracked) 
Vehicles 
(Wheeled) 
Night  
Vision 
Body  
Armor 
Acquired Items (𝑆𝑖 = 1) 0.317 1.437 -40.295 -0.920 27.231  
(0.639) (10.21) (142.74) (2.30) (27.72)  
 
    
N 1,928 1,346 1,843 1,928 1,557 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Tracked vehicles have a positive coefficient while wheeled vehicles have a negative coefficient, 
though neither measure is significant. One reason for the insignificant effects is that portioning 
the categories into smaller categories incurs a sample size issue. During this period, there were 
few acquisitions of vehicles and these other categories as they barely represent 3% of total 
acquisitions. 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
 The results in the previous section show that the militarization of police through the 
Pentagon’s 1033 Program does not lead to more use-of-force incidents. In the specific case of 
vehicles, it lowers the rate of use-of-force incidents. This result can be explained through the fact 
that vehicles are used during rescue operations and natural disasters (Shaw, 2015). Another 
explanation is that as of 2012, surplus acquisition was a relatively new phenomenon. 
  
                                                          
11 Tracked vehicles were initially banned by the Obama administration in 2015, but were reinstated by the Trump 
Administration in August 2017. 
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Figure 1. Total Acquisitions from the 1033 Program 1990–2016 
 
(Source: Author’s calculations from the Pentagon’s website) 
 
As shown in Figure 1, interest in and the use of the 1033 Program is a recent phenomenon. There 
was an initial increase in acquisitions in 2006, followed by a large spike in 2013, and the number 
of acquisitions has continued to increase. Any dynamic between acquisitions and crime and 
negative externalities may not be evident in an analysis that uses a time sample prior to 2012. 
 The recent literature on police militarization and their effects have consistently shown 
that increased militarization lowers crime at the county level. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) find 
that higher-value military surplus acquisitions lower various arrest rates. They argue that 
militarization has a deterrent effect that increases the cost of criminal activities. Harris et al. 
(2017) find that militarization has similar effects on crime, even though those authors use 
different instruments and a different set of controls. There have been other studies addressing the 
relationship between police militarization and crime. McQuoid and Haynes, Jr. (2017), in their 
working paper using a panel of states, find a negative relationship between crime and 
militarization. In another working paper, Masera (2016) uses agency-level analysis and finds 
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militarization lowers crime. However, he is able to show that one-third of this effect is due to the 
shifting of crime to neighboring regions. 
Few of these studies, however, address the potential adverse outcomes of police 
militarization. As described in the Data section, the lack of quality data, both in terms of validity 
and breadth, limits the degree to which rigorous analysis can occur. While Bove and Gavrilova 
(2017) and Harris et al. (2017) find that increased police militarization has no significant effect 
on citizen complaints or excessive use-of-force incidents, only Harris et al. (2017) mentions the 
issue of faulty data when it comes to collecting a nationally representative database of use-of-
force incidents. Furthermore, using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Masera 
(2016) finds that police militarization does increase officer-involved shootings.12 Thus, there is 
more work to be done to better understand how police militarization affects local communities. 
 Another issue we need to think about when we discuss police militarization is how the 
items that are disbursed are employed in communities throughout the country. We need to 
consider whether, once deployed, they are disproportionately used against people of color or in 
low-income communities. Police militarization became an issue after the unrest in Ferguson, 
Missouri following the death of Michael Brown, an 18-year old African-American male, at the 
hands of Officer Darren Wilson. Images of the National Guard looking like an occupying force 
struck many in the public and media as problematic. Furthermore, after the recent acquittal of 
Officer Jason Stockley in the death of Anthony Lynn Smith, the St. Louis Police Department was 
already prepared in riot gear in anticipation of protests. However, earlier in the year there was 
minimal police presence during the Women’s March, conducted a day after the Presidential 
                                                          
12 As with other data, the FBI count of fatal encounters has been shown to undercount the actual numbers of 
police killings. 
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Inauguration (Blay, 2017). Further research, with available data, can help us to understand 
whether there are racial disparities in where and how military surplus items are used. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Images of police in U.S. towns deploying high-tech weaponry and tanks normally 
observed in war-torn nations have raised questions regarding the purpose of heavily arming 
civilian police. In addition, law enforcement officials have engaged in behavior more similar to 
that of the military as opposed to community policing. It has been argued that this blurring of the 
lines between the military and police is an outcome of the militarization of local law enforcement 
(Den Heyer, 2014; Kraska, 2007). The acquisition of military-type equipment has led to military-
style tactics, such as the establishment of SWAT teams and no-knock raids. Instead of using 
these items in a reactive manner, police agencies use them proactively, which has sometimes led 
to fatal mistakes (Balko, 2013). The findings in this study show a causal link between the 
militarization of police and excessive use-of-force incidents. 
 Concern regarding the militarization of police is not new, but discussions in this regard 
have become more prevalent given the public incidents in Ferguson, Baltimore, and in many 
other U.S. cities. Such concerns are the subject of significant debate in the criminal justice 
literature (Den Heyer, 2014; Kappeler and Kraska, 2015). This study aimed to estimate whether 
the militarization of police, measured by the acquisition of military surplus through the 
Pentagon’s 1033 Program, impacts on use-of-force incidents. Using a treatment effects estimator 
to identify a causal link, this study did not find evidence that the increased militarization of 
police is associated with a greater incidence of excessive force. In fact, the acquisition of 
vehicles lowered the prevalence of incidents. The concern of many groups about the growing 
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militarization of police is that it further damages the poor community relationship between police 
and citizens. The issues associated with police militarization are increasingly recognized as a 
problem at both the federal and local levels. In January 2015, former U.S. President Barack 
Obama established the Law Enforcement Working Group to find solutions to the police 
militarization problem. Many local agencies have started to return military items to the federal 
government. In February 2016, the Los Angeles Unified School District returned all of its 
acquired military surplus items (Kohli and Blume, 2016). However, the current U.S. President 
Donald Trump reversed the restrictions of the prior administration on specific types of military 
surplus.  
An important issue emphasized in this study is the need for better data to conduct more 
conclusive research on excessive force. One limitation of this study is that it lacked detailed 
information on the nature of excessive force incidents. Currently, two national-level datasets, the 
PPCS from the BJS and the International Association of Chief of Police database, collect 
information on use-of-force incidents. However, these datasets are not nationally 
representative.13 Hickman et al. (2008) use the PPCS and the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails to 
generate aggregate numbers. Alpert and Smith (1999) argue that better organization and 
documentation of use-of-force incidents could improve policing. In Utah, agencies have begun 
requiring the collection of data on the deployment of tactical teams (Kaste, 2015). California has 
collected data on three types of police–citizen interactions: officers killed or assaulted, arrest 
rates, and deaths in custody.14 These data date back to 1980 and are updated continuously. 
Finally, the previous White House administration established the Public Safety Open Data 
                                                          
13 Fryer (2016) creates a detailed dataset on police-citizen interactions, but this is for a limited number of cities. 
14 The website can be found at http://openjustice.doj.ca.gov/.  
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Portal15 for law enforcement agencies to voluntarily submit data on use-of-force incidents, 
officer-involved shootings, traffic stops, and other relevant data. As we gain access to more data, 
we can improve our understanding of police–citizen interactions, police behavior, and use-of-
force incidents. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
15 This website is now run by the Police Foundation: https://publicsafetydataportal.org/  
24 | P a g e  
 
REFERENCES 
Ajilore, O., 2015. The militarization of local law enforcement: is race a factor? Appl. Econ. Lett. 
22(13), 1089–1093. 
Ajilore, O. and Shirey, S., 2017. Do# AllLivesMatter? An Evaluation of Race and Excessive Use 
of Force by Police. Atlantic Economic Journal, pp.1-12. 
Alpert, G.P., Smith, M.R., 1999. Police use-of-force data: where we are and where we should be 
going. Police Q. 2(1), 57–78. 
ACLU, 2014. War come home: the excessive militarization of American policing. 
Antonovics, K., Knight, B.G., 2009. A new look at racial profiling: evidence from the Boston 
Police Department. Rev. Econ. Stat. 91(1), 163–177. 
Anwar, S., Fang, H., 2006. An alternative test of racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches: 
theory and evidence. Am. Econ. Rev. 96(1), 127–151. 
Balko, R. 2013. Rise of the warrior cop: The militarization of America's police forces. Public 
Affairs Books. 
Benson, B. L., D. W. Rasmussen, and D. L. Sollars. 1995. "Police bureaucracies, their 
incentives, and the war on drugs." Public Choice 83.1-2 (1995): 21-45. 
Blay, Z. "Before You Celebrate The Zero Arrests At The Women's March..." The Huffington 
Post. January 23, 2017. Accessed October 19, 2017. 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/before-you-celebrate-the-zero-arrests-at-the-
womens-march_us_588617e4e4b0e3a7356a3ee4  
Bove, V. and Gavrilova, E. 2017. Police Officer on the Frontline or a Soldier? The Effect of 
Police Militarization on Crime. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9(3), 1-
18. 
Cerulli, G., 2014. ivtreatreg: A command for fitting binary treatment models with heterogeneous 
response to treatment and unobservable selection. Stata J. 14(3), 453–480. 
Close, B.R., Mason, P.L., 2007. Searching for efficient enforcement: officer characteristics and 
racially biased policing. Rev. Law Econ. 3(2), 263–321. 
Den Heyer, G., 2014. Mayberry revisited: a review of the influence of police paramilitary units 
on policing. Polic. Soc. 24(3), 346–361. 
Dharmapala, D., Garoupa, N., McAdams, R.H., 2016. Punitive police? Agency costs, law 
enforcement, and criminal procedure. The J. of Leg Stud 45(1): 105–141  
Friedrich, R.J., 1980. Police use of force: individuals, situations, and organizations. Ann. Am. 
Acad. Political Soc. Sci. 452(1), 82–97. 
Fryer, Jr., R. 2016. An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force. National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22399 
Garner, J.H., Maxwell, C.D., Heraux, C.G., 2002. Characteristics associated with the prevalence 
and severity of force used by the police. Justice Q. 19(4), 705–746. 
Grasso, V.B., 2013. Defense surplus equipment disposal: background information. Library of 
Congress, Washington, DC Congressional Research Service. 
25 | P a g e  
 
Hall, A. R., Coyne, C.J. 2013. The Militarization of US Domestic Policing. The Indep. 
Rev. 17(4), 485-504 
Harris, M.C., Park, J., Bruce, D.J. and Murray, M.N., 2017. Peacekeeping force: Effects of 
providing tactical equipment to local law enforcement. American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 9(3), pp.291-313. 
Hickman, M.J., Piquero, A.R., Garner, J.H., 2008. Toward a national estimate of police use of 
nonlethal force. Criminol. Public Policy 7(4), 563–604. 
Kappeler, V.E., Kraska, P.B., 2015. Normalising police militarisation, living in denial. Polic. 
Soc. 25(3), 268–275. 
Kaste. M. Why Utah is the Only State Trying to Track and Limit SWAT-Style Tactics. NPR 
Morning Edition. August 31, 2015 
Kohli, S., Blume, H. 2016. L.A. Schools Have Given up the Last of their Defense Department-
issued Rifles. Los Angeles Times. February 23, 2016. 
Knowles, J., Persico, N., Todd, P., 2001. Racial bias in motor vehicle searches: theory and 
evidence. J. Political Econ. 109(1), 203–229. 
Kraska, P.B., 2007. Militarization and policing—its relevance to 21st century police. Polic. 1(4), 
501–513. 
McQuoid, A.F. and Haynes, J.B., 2017. The Thin (Red) Blue Line: Police Militarization and 
Violent Crime. United States Naval Academy Department of Economics. 
Masera, F., Bringing War Home: Violent Crime, Police Killings and the Overmilitarization of 
the US Police (October 12, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2851522 
Musgrave, S. Every Item Distributed to Local Law Enforcement by the Pentagon’s 1033 
Program Over Two Years. MuckRock. August 15, 2014 
Prendergast, C., 2007. The motivation and bias of bureaucrats. Am. Econ. Rev. 97, 180–196. 
Reardon, S.F., Firebaugh, G., 2002. Measures of multigroup segregation. Sociol. 
Methodol. 32(1), 33–67. 
Rezvani, A., Pupovac, J., Eads, D., Fisher, T. MRAPs and Bayonets: What We Know About the 
Pentagon’s 1033 Program. NPR. September 2, 2014 
Riksheim, E.C., Chermak, S.M., 1993. Causes of police behavior revisited. J. Crim. Justice 
21(4), 353–382. 
Shaw, Adam. "Outrage as military vehicles, equipment taken from officers in wake of Obama 
order." Fox News. November 23, 2015. Accessed October 20, 2017. 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/11/23/outrage-as-military-vehicles-equipment-
taken-from-officers-in-wake-obama-order.html. 
Smith, B.W., Holmes, M.D., 2014. Police use of excessive force in minority communities: a test 
of the minority threat, place, and community accountability hypotheses. Soc. Probl. 
61(1), 83–104. 
Sun, I.Y., Payne, B.K., Wu, Y., 2008. The impact of situational factors, officer characteristics, 
and neighborhood context on police behavior: a multilevel analysis. J. Crim. Justice 
36(1), 22–32. 
26 | P a g e  
 
Worden, R.E., 1995. The causes of police brutality: theory and evidence on police use of force. 
in W. A. Geller, & H. Toch, eds., And Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling 
Police Abuse of Force. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum 
  
27 | P a g e  
 
APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table 1A. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates  
 Total Tactical Guns Vehicles Surveillance Clothing 
Surplus Acquisitions 0.021 0.070+ 0.070+ 0.135+ 0.116+ 0.110+ 
 (0.021) (0.036) (0.036) (0.075) (0.062) (0.062) 
       
Entry-level wage -0.071 -0.067 -0.067 -0.054 -0.056 -0.059 
 (0.257) (0.255) (0.255) (0.254) (0.254) (0.255) 
Asset Forfeiture (Budget) 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.113 0.109 0.107 
 (0.133) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
Body Camera Use  -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Dash Camera Use -0.008 -0.014 -0.014 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
Share of Black Officers -0.549 -0.508 -0.507 -0.444 -0.479 -0.460 
 (0.404) (0.405) (0.405) (0.407) (0.408) (0.414) 
Share of Hispanic Officers -0.190 -0.175 -0.175 -0.174 -0.183 -0.177 
 (0.543) (0.540) (0.540) (0.530) (0.537) (0.530) 
8 Hrs. of Comm. Policing  0.136+ 0.139+ 0.139+ 0.144+ 0.146+ 0.145+ 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
       
Elderly Share -2.683 -2.666 -2.666 -2.660 -2.703 -2.586 
 (1.954) (1.958) (1.958) (1.971) (1.953) (1.958) 
Owner-Occupied Share -0.849 -0.858 -0.859 -0.834 -0.821 -0.814 
 (0.865) (0.862) (0.862) (0.863) (0.859) (0.860) 
Youth Share -2.847 -2.930 -2.931 -2.950 -2.928 -2.866 
 (2.107) (2.102) (2.102) (2.132) (2.115) (2.134) 
Gini Index -2.794 -2.584 -2.582 -2.563 -2.578 -2.635 
 (2.035) (1.996) (1.996) (2.039) (2.029) (2.029) 
Unemployment Rate -0.318 -0.281 -0.282 0.091 -0.048 0.044 
 (3.562) (3.560) (3.561) (3.572) (3.542) (3.563) 
Median Household Income -0.559+ -0.533+ -0.533+ -0.536+ -0.541+ -0.538+ 
 (0.310) (0.305) (0.305) (0.304) (0.301) (0.302) 
Crime Index 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.059 0.059 0.056 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
Census Population 0.296*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.379*** 0.366*** 0.363*** 
 (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.070) (0.068) (0.061) 
Share Black -0.218 -0.194 -0.193 -0.224 -0.214 -0.209 
 (0.404) (0.405) (0.405) (0.416) (0.412) (0.416) 
Share Latino -0.078 -0.088 -0.088 -0.145 -0.129 -0.116 
 (0.786) (0.789) (0.789) (0.775) (0.787) (0.779) 
Segregation Index -0.857* -0.859* -0.859* -0.859* -0.877* -0.855* 
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 (0.399) (0.399) (0.399) (0.401) (0.402) (0.402) 
       
SWAT team 0.194 0.191 0.191 0.193 0.191 0.191 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) 
Gang Taskforce  -0.072 -0.071 -0.071 -0.055 -0.062 -0.061 
 (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.097) (0.099) (0.099) 
Drug Taskforce 0.064 0.070 0.070 0.079 0.076 0.080 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082) (0.085) 
Terrorism Special Unit 0.214+ 0.216+ 0.216+ 0.219+ 0.216+ 0.217+ 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) 
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Table 2A. Full Estimation Results of Binary Treatment Model  
Total 
Surplus 
1st Stage 
Probit 
  
Acquired Items (𝑆𝑖 = 1) 0.761  
  
 
(0.729)  
  
 
  Instruments 
 
Entry-level wage 0.175 0.125 Distance to Center 0.067  
(0.175) (0.175) 
 
(0.060) 
Asset Forfeiture (Budget) -0.232 0.110 Field activity center 0.154  
(0.233) (0.082) 
 
(0.112) 
Body Camera Use  -0.025 0.013 County area 0.107+  
(0.093) (0.088) 
 
(0.058) 
Dash Camera Use 0.127 0.229* HIDTA region  
 (0.105) (0.089) Atlantic1 -0.109 
Share of Black Officers -0.881+ 0.448 
 
(0.201) 
 (0.513) (0.506) Atlantic2 -0.246 
Share of Hispanic Officers -0.260 -0.870+ 
 
(0.274) 
 (0.492) (0.455) California 0.297 
8 Hrs. of Community Policing  0.039 0.073 
 
(0.283) 
 (0.085) (0.077) Los Angeles 0.916** 
   
 
(0.334) 
Elderly Share -3.195+ -0.762 Pacific -0.752* 
 (1.672) (1.737) 
 
(0.294) 
Owner-Occupied Share 0.738 0.705 Rocky Mountain -0.226 
 (0.789) (0.796) 
 
(0.254) 
Youth Share -0.742 2.609 Southwest1 -0.420 
 (1.712) (1.668) 
 
(0.256) 
Gini Index 1.052 -2.445 Southwest2 0.355 
 (1.781) (1.590) 
 
(0.292) 
Unemployment Rate -2.161 4.830 Florida 0.392+ 
 (3.644) (3.207) 
 
(0.230) 
Median Household Income -0.339+ -0.322 Gulf Coast -0.193 
 (0.199) (0.271) 
 
(0.352) 
Crime Index 0.132 0.263** Midwest 0.150 
 (0.103) (0.101) 
 
(0.222) 
Census Population 0.218*** 0.075+ Michigan/Ohio 0.420* 
 (0.056) (0.041) 
 
(0.209) 
Share Black -0.419 -0.846 Wisconsin/Lake County 0.426 
 (1.039) (0.526) 
 
(0.261) 
Share Latino -0.596 -0.888+ Chicago 0.339 
 (0.835) (0.539) 
 
(0.271) 
Segregation Index -1.379 -0.527 New York/New Jersey -0.292 
 (1.001) (0.373) 
 
(0.197) 
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   New England 0.052 
SWAT team 0.452+ 0.094 
 
(0.217) 
 (0.243) (0.085) 
  
Gang Taskforce  -0.289 0.152 
  
 (0.295) (0.094) 
  
Drug Taskforce -0.006 0.014 
  
 (0.245) (0.090) 
  
Terrorism Special Unit 0.150 -0.015 
  
 (0.206) (0.077) 
  
   
  
Kliebergen-Paap F Statistic 15.322  
  
Hansen J-statistic p-value 0.385  
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Figure 1A. HIDTA designated regions 
 
 
 
